



IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT 
 
 
NETCHOICE LLC, ET AL., 
Plaintiffs–Appellees, 
v. 
ATTORNEY GENERAL, STATE OF FLORIDA, ET AL.,  
Defendants-Appellants.  
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the Northern District of Florida, NO. 4:21-CV-220-RH-MAF 
 
BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE THE REPORTERS COMMITTEE 
FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, AMERICAN BOOKSELLERS 
ASSOCIATION, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, AMERICAN 
CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF FLORIDA, THE AUTHORS GUILD INC., 
THE MEDIA COALITION FOUNDATION, INC., THE MEDIA LAW 
RESOURCE CENTER, INC., AND PEN AMERICAN CENTER, INC. IN 





      
SHULLMAN FUGATE PLLC 
Deanna K. Shullman 
Florida Bar No. 514462 
2101 Vista Parkway, Suite 4006 
West Palm Beach, Florida 33411 
Telephone: (561) 429-3619 
Email:dshullman@shullmanfugate.com 
Counsel for Amici Curiae 
 
 
USCA11 Case: 21-12355     Date Filed: 11/15/2021     Page: 1 of 33 
NetChoice, LLC, et al. v. Attorney General, State of Florida, et al., No. 21-12355 
 C-1 of 2 
CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PERSONS AND 
CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT 
 
 The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press is an unincorporated 
association of reporters and editors with no parent corporation and no stock.  The 
American Booksellers Association has no parent corporation and no publicly held 
corporation owns 10% or more of its stock.  The American Civil Liberties Union 
(“ACLU”) and American Civil Liberties Union of Florida are non-profit entities 
that do not have parent corporations, and in which no publicly held corporation 
owns 10% or more of any stake or stock.  The Authors Guild Inc. has no parent 
corporation and no publicly held corporation owns 10% or more of its stock.  The 
Media Coalition Foundation, Inc. has no parent corporation and no publicly held 
corporation owns 10% or more of its stock.  The Media Law Resource Center has 
no parent corporations and issues no stock.  PEN American Center, Inc. has no 
parent or affiliate corporation. 
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 26.1 and Eleventh Circuit 
Rule 26.1, the undersigned certifies that, in addition to the persons listed in the 
certificate of interested persons filed by the parties, the following persons (amici 
curiae, their parent corporations, publicly held corporations that own 10% or more 
of the stock, and their counsel) are known to have an interest in the outcome of this 
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1. The Media Coalition Foundation, Inc. 
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 1 
IDENTITY OF AMICI CURIAE, THEIR INTEREST IN THE CASE, AND 
THE SOURCE OF THEIR AUTHORITY TO FILE  
 
 The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, American Booksellers 
Association, the American Civil Liberties Union, the American Civil Liberties 
Union of Florida, the Authors Guild Inc., the Media Coalition Foundation, Inc., the 
Media Law Resource Center, Inc., and PEN American Center, Inc. (collectively, 
“amici”), by and through undersigned counsel, respectfully submit this brief as 
amici curiae in support of Plaintiffs-Appellees.  All parties have consented to the 
filing of this brief.  See Fed. R. App. P. 29(a)(2).    
Amici are organizations dedicated to defending the First Amendment 
freedoms and newsgathering rights of journalists and news organizations.  Amici 
collectively represent the First Amendment interests of media outlets and 
communication platforms across all technologies, and the public’s interest in 
receiving and disseminating information free from government censorship or 
control.  Amici submit this brief because Senate Bill 7072, enacted in 2021 (“S.B. 
7072”), would, were it allowed to take effect, violate fundamental First 
Amendment rights necessary to preserve robust public debate across all media. 
The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press (the “Reporters 
Committee”) is an unincorporated nonprofit association founded by leading 
journalists and media lawyers in 1970 when the nation’s news media faced an 
unprecedented wave of government subpoenas forcing reporters to name 
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 2 
confidential sources.  Today, its attorneys provide pro bono legal representation, 
amicus curiae support, and other legal resources to protect First Amendment 
Freedoms and the newsgathering rights of journalists.   
The American Booksellers Association (“ABA”) was founded in 1900 and 
is a national not-for-profit trade organization that works to help independently 
owned bookstores grow and succeed.  ABA represents 1900 member companies 
operating in 2400 locations.  ABA’s core members are key participants in their 
communities' local economy and culture, and to assist them ABA provides 
education, information dissemination, business products, and services; creates 
relevant programs; and engages in public policy, industry, and local first advocacy. 
The American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”) is a nationwide, non-
partisan, non-profit organization.  The organization is dedicated to defending the 
principles embodied in the Constitution and our nation’s civil rights laws and, for 
over a century, has been at the forefront of efforts nationwide to protect the full 
array of civil rights and liberties, including freedom of speech and freedom of the 
press online.  The ACLU has frequently appeared before courts throughout the 
country in First Amendment cases, both as direct counsel and as amici curiae.  The 
American Civil Liberties Union of Florida (“ACLU of Florida”) is a state 
affiliate of the ACLU. 
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The Authors Guild, Inc. was founded in 1912, and is a national non-profit 
association of more than 9,000 professional, published writers of all genres.  The 
Guild counts historians, biographers, academicians, journalists and other writers of 
nonfiction and fiction as members.  The Guild works to promote the rights and 
professional interests of authors in various areas, including defending their right of 
freedom of expression.  Many Guild members earn their livelihoods through their 
writing.  Their work covers important issues in history, biography, science, 
politics, medicine, business and other areas; they are frequent contributors to the 
most influential and well-respected publications in every field. 
The Media Coalition Foundation, Inc. monitors potential legal threats to 
the First Amendment rights, and engages in strategic litigation and provides 
amicus support in notable cases to protect the rights of speakers and those seeking 
to access speech, as guaranteed by the First Amendment. 
The Media Law Resource Center (“MLRC”) is a non-profit professional 
association for content providers in all media, and for their defense lawyers, 
providing a wide range of resources on media and content law, as well as policy 
issues.  These include news and analysis of legal, legislative, and regulatory 
developments; litigation resources and practice guides; and national and 
international media law conferences and meetings.  The MLRC also works with its 
membership to respond to legislative and policy proposals and speaks to the press 
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and public on media law and First Amendment issues.  It counts as members over 
125 media companies, including newspaper, magazine and book publishers, and 
radio broadcasters, and digital platforms, and over 200 law firms working in the 
media law field.  The MLRC was founded in 1980 by leading American publishers 
and broadcasters to assist in defending and protecting free press rights under the 
First Amendment. 
PEN American Center, Inc. (“PEN America” or “PEN”) is a nonprofit 
organization that represents and advocates for the freedom to write and freedom of 
expression, both in the United States and abroad.  PEN America is affiliated with 
more than 100 centers worldwide that comprise the PEN International network.  Its 
membership includes more than 7,500 journalists, novelists, poets, essayists, and 
other professionals.  PEN America stands at the intersection of journalism, 
literature, and human rights to protect free expression.  PEN champions the 
freedom of people everywhere to write, create literature, convey information and 
ideas, and express their views, recognizing the power of the word to transform the 
world.  PEN America supports the First Amendment and freedom of expression in 
the United States. 
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RULE 29(a)(4)(E) STATEMENT 
 No party’s counsel authored any part of this amici curiae brief.  No person 
other than amici or their counsel contributed money intended to fund the 
preparation or submission of this amici curiae brief. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
 S.B. 7072 poses an acute threat to essential First Amendment protections for 
the press and public.  The law, if allowed to take effect, would compel private 
communications platforms to carry speech that they otherwise would not, and 
would allow the State of Florida (the “State”) to directly regulate how these 
platforms curate, edit, or comment on speech that they host.  Giving the State such 
authority would permit government officials to force platforms to carry speech 
perceived as favorable to the government or to pressure platforms to remove 
speech perceived as unfavorable.  S.B. 7072 would therefore impermissibly vest 
the State with the pure power of the censor.  
Amici the Reporters Committee, MLRC, and PEN America take no position 
on technology platforms’ content moderation policies or practices; other amici, 
including the ACLU, have expressed normative views on the public policy 
implications of how and when major platforms moderate content by users, 
including public officials.  All amici are, however, united in their position that the 
curation of lawful content online constitutes an exercise of “editorial control and 
judgment,” which cannot be regulated by the state “consistent with First 
Amendment guarantees.”  Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 
(1974) (“Tornillo”).  
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Accordingly, amici respectfully offer the following three points in support of 
Plaintiffs-Appellees. 
First, S.B. 7072’s provisions prohibiting platforms from removing or 
restricting content posted by “political candidates” and “journalistic enterprises,” 
banning platforms from adding disclaimers or other commentary to third-party 
content, and requiring platforms to apply standards and terms of service 
“consistently” to third-party posts violate the rule against government interference 
in the editorial process articulated by the Supreme Court in Tornillo.  418 U.S. at 
258.  The Tornillo Court held that the First Amendment protects editorial 
autonomy— protection that applies to editorial choices by private speakers 
generally, not limited to a particular medium.  Indeed, the State’s claimed purpose 
for enacting S.B. 7072—“balancing the discussion”—is precisely the type of 
government interference in public discourse held flatly unconstitutional in 
Tornillo.  Moreover, as the Tornillo Court made clear, the mere fact that a private 
speaker has significant market power does not reduce the protection the First 
Amendment affords to its editorial decision-making, contrary to the State’s 
assertions.  As such, were S.B. 7072 found to pass constitutional muster, it could 
erode Tornillo’s protections for speakers across all media. 
Second, while many of the online platforms affected by S.B. 7072 primarily 
serve as virtual meeting places, the acts that would be regulated by S.B. 7072—
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deciding what speech to present, how, when, and to whom, as well as the addition 
of the platform’s own commentary to that speech—are quintessentially editorial 
choices.  Social media platforms are specially curated environments for speech on 
specific topics or among specific communities. Even those platforms that broadly 
welcome speech from a wide variety of users and on a wide range of topics still 
actively curate the channels of speech they provide.  These platforms gather 
information from the public, vet it both before and after publication, and present it 
to their audiences.  Editorial choices are central and essential to this process.   
Defendants-Appellants, however, attempt to distinguish between a 
newspaper and the targeted platforms by arguing that the former is a “unified 
speech product that conveys a coherent message or offers perspectives on one or 
more overarching themes,” while the latter is more akin to a cacophony of voices.  
Opening Brief of Appellant at 24, Netchoice v. Moody, No. 21-12355 (11th Cir. 
Sept. 7, 2021).  But that is a distinction without a difference.  First, the service each 
platform provides is a distinct experience for a reader, listener, viewer, or other 
speech consumer—for instance, some are heavily moderated, while others are not.  
Second, and crucially, Tornillo and its progeny say nothing about a “unified speech 
product” being a legally relevant concept.  Rather, those cases reflect the reality 
that, as soon as the government gets into the business of regulating editorial 
discretion, it has the ability to influence public discourse to its advantage (a reality 
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experienced by billions globally who suffer under state-controlled media).  
Tornillo is concerned with editorial choices, irrespective of medium.  And what 
S.B. 7072 seeks to control are editorial choices.  
Third, Defendants-Appellants present no limiting principle to their proffered 
constitutional rule.  That S.B. 7072 would apply only to large social media 
platforms (at least those not in the same corporate family as an amusement park) is 
a matter of legislative drafting, not constitutional law.  As such, the rule that 
Defendants suggest—effectively, that platforms primarily hosting third-party 
speech are categorically excluded from First Amendment protections when the 
government seeks to regulate the platforms’ own editorial choices about what to 
host, when, and how—could significantly impair the emergence of “new media” 
platforms, such as online services that offer journalists and others tools to serve as 
their own publishers. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The Tornillo rule is a crucial protection for speakers across all media; 
were S.B. 7072 found to pass constitutional muster, it would erode the 
vitality of that rule to the profound detriment of free public discourse.  
 
By its plain terms, S.B. 7072 would force private fora for third-party speech 
to publish content that they otherwise would not, would control how platforms 
present the speech they host, and would directly gag the platform’s speech by 
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prohibiting lawful content1, including “addend[a]” to posts.  S.B. 7072 § 4(1)(b), 
2021 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2021).  Worse, the legislature has explicitly stated that 
its intent in passing S.B. 7072 was to combat perceived political bias by large 
technology companies—that is, the State has openly admitted that its goal is to use 
state power to skew online discourse in its favor.  See News Release, Ron 
DeSantis, Governor, State of Florida, Governor Ron DeSantis Signs Bill to Stop 
the Censorship of Floridians by Big Tech (May 24, 2021), https://perma.cc/2PGG-
ZBYF (compiling quotes from legislators about the intent behind S.B. 7072).  As 
such, were S.B. 7072’s content moderation restrictions allowed to stand, that 
precedent would imperil protections for journalists and others, across all media, by 
limiting the scope of the Tornillo rule.  To do so would authorize an “intrusion into 
 
1  Amici emphasize that S.B. 7072 would regulate lawful content and, indeed, 
is aimed, at least in part if not entirely, at core political speech, “an area in which 
the importance of First Amendment protections is at its zenith.”  Meyer v. Grant, 
486 U.S. 414, 425 (1988) (internal quotation marks omitted).  This is not a 
regulation concerning “a classic example[] of commercial speech,” see Pittsburgh 
Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973), 
nor does it involve the application of generally applicable laws like antitrust 
against a private speaker, see Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 254 (distinguishing Associated 
Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945), and stressing that the district court 
decree at issue there did not “compel AP or its members to permit publication of 
anything which their ‘reason’ tells them should not be published” (quoting 326 
U.S. at 20 n.18)).  Rather, S.B. 7072 directly interferes with the ability of 
communications platforms to present core political speech as their “reason” 
dictates.  Id. at 256. 
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the function of editors,” Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 258, placing the “liberty of the press . 
. .  in peril.”  Id. at 258 n. 24.   
In Tornillo, the Court invalidated a Florida law requiring publications to 
give politicians a “right of reply” in the publication to editorials that attacked their 
personal character or official record.  Id. at 244.  In doing so, the Court held that 
government intrusion into the editorial process “dampens the vigor and limits the 
variety of public debate,” id. at 257 (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 
254, 279 (1964)), and that “a major purpose of [the First] Amendment was to 
protect the free discussion of governmental affairs.” Id. at 259 (White, J., 
concurring) (citation omitted).  That insulation of public debate from state control, 
the Court held, serves “as a powerful antidote to any abuses of power.”  Id. at 260. 
Indeed, such a concern was not abstract for the Court in Tornillo.  The 
Court’s ruling came at the height of the fallout from Watergate and shortly after a 
request by President Richard Nixon that the Justice Department explore the need 
for a federal “right-of-reply” statute because of press coverage perceived as critical 
of his administration.  Anthony Lewis, Nixon and a Right of Reply, N.Y. Times, 
Mar. 24, 1974, at E2, https://perma.cc/2W2J-AJ65 (“Overhanging the debate is the 
reality of Watergate, where a vigorous press broke through repeated official White 
House denials of wrongdoing.”). 
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The choice of what to say or not say—the heart of the editorial process—is 
indivisible.  In other words, editorial autonomy is an on-off switch—“it is either 
there or it is not.”  Lucas A. Powe, Jr., The Fourth Estate and the Constitution 277 
(1992).  As such, the Court in Tornillo applied a bright-line rule with respect to 
acts of editorial discretion—“any . . . compulsion to publish that which reason tells 
[the press] should not be published is unconstitutional.”  418 U.S. at 256 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
S.B. 7072 would limit platforms’ ability to remove or restrict the speech of 
“political candidates” or “journalistic enterprises,” would require platforms to 
apply their content moderation policies “consistent[ly]” across all users (with 
“consistency” to be dictated by the State), and would restrain platforms from 
adding disclaimers or other commentary to speech they host.  S.B. 7072 § 2, § 
4(2)(b), § 4(2)(j), 2021 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2021).  These are self-evidently 
editorial acts—much like a newspaper deciding which syndicated cartoons to run 
or op-eds to take, when to run them, and how to present them visually in the funny 
pages or editorial section.  And the danger of state censorship that animated the 
holding in Tornillo is present in equal measure here—either through direct 
government control of what is said or not said, or through a chilling effect.  See 
418 U.S. at 257 (“Faced with the penalties that would accrue to any newspaper that 
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published news or commentary arguably within the reach of the right-of-access 
statute, editors might well conclude that the safe course is to avoid controversy.”).2   
Further, while Tornillo involved a print newspaper, the First Amendment 
protections for editorial autonomy the Court recognized are manifestly agnostic as 
to medium and apply “well beyond the newspaper context.”  See, e.g., Jian Zhang 
v. Baidu.com Inc., 10 F. Supp. 3d 433, 437 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).  Parade organizers, 
for example, have the First Amendment right to curate groups that participate in a 
parade and exclude those with messages they do not wish to present.  Hurley v. 
Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 569–70 (1995).  
Moreover, “whatever the challenges of applying the Constitution to ever-
advancing technology, ‘the basic principles of freedom of speech and the press, 
like the First Amendment's command, do not vary’ when a new and different 
medium for communication appears.  Brown v. Ent. Merchants Ass’n, 564 U.S. 
786, 790 (2011) (quoting Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 503 
(1952)).  In other words, Tornillo’s rule against government interference with 
 
2  While much of the Court’s opinion focused on the potential for chilling 
public discourse, the Court conspicuously affirmed that its conclusion does not rest 
on chill.  418 U.S. at 258 (“Even if a newspaper would face no additional costs to 
comply with a compulsory access law and would not be forced to forgo publication 
of news or opinion by the inclusion of a reply, the Florida statute fails to clear the 
barriers of the First Amendment because of its intrusion into the function of 
editors.”).  The lack of qualification in the Tornillo opinion is a testament to just 
how foundational the separation of government and editor is to our political 
system. 
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editorial judgment is not “restricted to the press,”  Hurley, 515 U.S. at 574, and it 
protects “business corporations” and “ordinary people engaged in unsophisticated 
expression” alike, id.  
Applying these principles, the district court rightly held that S.B. 7072’s 
stated purpose of “balancing the discussion” by “reining in the ideology of the 
large social media providers” through control of their “editorial judgments” is 
“precisely the kind of state action held unconstitutional” in Tornillo and Hurley.  
Netchoice v. Moody, No. 21-cv-220-MAF, 2021 WL 2690876, *9 (N.D. Fla. June 
30, 2021).   
Numerous other courts have likewise determined that the editorial judgments 
of online platforms receive First Amendment protection.  Courts have held that the 
editorial judgments of a search engine are akin to “the newspaper editor’s 
judgment of which wire-service stories to run and where to place them in the 
newspaper,” and are thus protected by the First Amendment.  Jian Zhang, 10 F. 
Supp. 3d at 438; see also e-ventures Worldwide, LLC v. Google, Inc., No. 14-cv-
646, 2017 WL 2210029, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 8, 2017) (“A search engine is akin 
to a publisher, whose judgments about what to publish and what not to publish are 
absolutely protected by the First Amendment.”); Search King, Inc. v. Google 
Tech., Inc., No. CIV-02-1457, 2003 WL 21464568, at *2–4 (W.D. Okla. May 27, 
2003) (concluding that search rankings are protected opinion).  And courts have 
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expressly held that the First Amendment protects an online platform’s decision to 
remove or exclude content.  See, e.g., La’Tiejira v. Facebook, Inc., 272 F. Supp. 3d 
981, 991 (S.D. Tex. 2017) (holding Facebook could decide whether to take down 
or leave up a post because of “Facebook’s First Amendment right to decide what to 
publish and what not to publish on its platform”);  Langdon v. Google, Inc., 474 F. 
Supp. 2d 622, 629–30 (D. Del. 2007) (holding that the First Amendment protects 
decisions to exclude content from a search platform).  
Notably, in S.B. 7072’s findings, the legislature cited “unfair” decisions by 
social media platforms that “censor” certain voices, S.B. 7072 § 1, 2021 Leg., Reg. 
Sess. (Fla. 2021), leading to the law’s command that platforms moderate content 
“consistent[ly] . . . among users,” id. at § 4(2)(b).  But the First Amendment 
safeguards free speech and a free press—it says nothing about fairness.  Tornillo, 
418 U.S. at 256 (“A responsible press is an undoubtedly desirable goal, but press 
responsibility is not mandated by the Constitution and like many other virtues it 
cannot be legislated.”).  Indeed, the press at the time of the First Amendment’s 
adoption was famously unfair.  See Powe, supra, at 278 (noting that the press in 
the founding era was “partisan and scurrilous”).  But the framers, clear-eyed, 
guaranteed the independence of the press because the alternative would be 
intolerable to American conceptions of liberty.  See Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 260 
(White, J., concurring). 
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Accordingly, the First Amendment prohibits the government from limiting 
editorial autonomy with respect to lawful content even when it has a strong 
justification for doing so.  See Jian Zhang, 10 F. Supp. 3d at 438 (“Put simply, 
‘[d]isapproval of a private speaker’s statement’—no matter how justified 
disapproval may be—‘does not legitimize use of the [government’s] power to 
compel the speaker to alter the message by including one more acceptable to 
others.’” (quoting Hurley, 515 U.S. at 581)).   
Finally, as the district court correctly recognized, the mere size or market 
power of a private speaker does not void Tornillo’s protections.  Netchoice, 2021 
WL 2690876, at *7 (“[T]he concentration of market power among large social-
media providers does not change the governing First Amendment principles.”); see 
also Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. F.C.C., 768 F.2d 1434, 1450 (D.C. Cir. 1985) 
(“[T]he Supreme Court has categorically rejected the suggestion that purely 
economic constraints on the number of voices available in a given community 
justify otherwise unwarranted intrusions into First Amendment rights.” (citing 
Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 247–56)); Preferred Commc’ns, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 
Cal., 754 F.2d 1396, 1404–05 (9th Cir. 1985), aff’d and remanded sub nom. City of 
Los Angeles v. Preferred Commc’ns, Inc., 476 U.S. 488 (1986) (finding barriers to 
entry do not justify right-of-access).  
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Indeed, Chief Justice Burger in Tornillo discussed the then, as now, acute 
public concern about diminished competition in mass media in great detail.  See 
418 U.S. at 251 (“The First Amendment interest of the public in being informed is 
said to be in peril because the ‘marketplace of ideas’ is today a monopoly 
controlled by the owners of the market.”).  The Tornillo Court traced the increased 
concentration of media since the founding, noting that “[t]he result of these vast 
changes has been to place in a few hands the power to inform the American people 
and shape public opinion.”  Id. at 250.  As one commenter noted, “were it not for 
the Court’s use of phrases like ‘access advocates,’ a person reading [that 
discussion] and stopping there would assume” that those advocates had won.  
Powe, supra, at 271.  But, ultimately, the Court concluded, “[h]owever much 
validity may be found in these arguments,” a coercive right of access would “at 
once bring[] about a confrontation with the express provisions of the First 
Amendment.”  Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 254.   
In sum, Tornillo unambiguously forecloses the State’s argument that market 
concentration alone can justify government interference in the editorial process.  
Were S.B. 7072 permitted to stand on that ground, it would likewise erode 
Tornillo’s protections for editorial autonomy. 
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II. That newspapers or other traditional news outlets create a “unified 
speech product” is not legally relevant to the First Amendment’s 
prohibition against state regulation of the editorial process. 
 
Defendants-Appellants attempt to distinguish Tornillo by asserting that 
newspapers, among other things, “curate articles to create a unified speech 
product,” and that, because social media platforms are primarily engaged in 
facilitating the speech of other private speakers to one another, S.B. 7072’s hosting 
provisions “do not interfere with any speech by the platforms . . . .”  Opening Brief 
of Appellant, supra, at 24.  Not only does this fundamentally mischaracterize the 
holding in Tornillo, which is concerned with editorial choices by any private 
speaker, the notion of a “unified speech product” (whatever that may mean as a 
practical matter) as the trigger for whether the First Amendment applies at all 
would significantly endanger press and speech rights in all media. 
As an initial matter, social media platforms do offer a “unified speech 
product.”  While they offer a service that allows private speakers to meet, share 
news, express opinions, or connect socially, the platforms are not “passive 
receptacle[s] or conduit[s] for news, comment, and advertising.”  Tornillo, 418 
U.S. at 258.  They often delete content and restrict or block users that violate their 
standards—which can include prohibitions against fraud, spreading what the 
platforms deem to be misinformation, hateful content, and glorification of 
violence, and other policies that limit the discussion of certain topics because the 
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platforms have determined that those topics are not appropriate for the platform 
they wish to provide.  See Netchoice, 2021 WL 2690876, at *9.  Platforms further 
use algorithms to prioritize posts and arrange lawful content in a manner designed 
to create a distinctive “speech product” that attracts users (and thus advertisers—
again, much like a metropolitan daily).  See, e.g., The Twitter Rules, https:// 
perma.cc/3F7Q-3RAP (last visited Nov. 5, 2021).  And some social media sites 
attach disclaimers or other commentary to posts to provide context, address what 
the platforms deem possible misinformation or other policy violations, or to alert 
readers or viewers to sensitive content.  These decisions help craft distinct user 
experiences that appeal to different groups, with “[u]sage of the major social media 
platforms var[ying] by factors such as age, gender and educational attainment.”  
Pew Rsch. Ctr., Social Media Fact Sheet (April 7 2021), https://perma.cc/EG32-
ZGRA (tracking demographic data and finding, for example, that while 48 percent 
of Americans between the ages of 18 and 29 use TikTok, only 28 percent of adults 
between 30 and 49 use the platform; in contrast, 73 percent of adults between 30 
and 49 use Facebook); see also Analisa Novak, TikTok Exec Explains Social 
Media Company’s Algorithm and Efforts to Keep Children Safe, CBS News (Oct. 
15, 2021), https://perma.cc/3L4E-ZXTE (“TikTok focuses on age-appropriate 
experiences and some features are not available to its younger users,” including the 
ability to send a direct message to other users.).    
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In any event, even if these platforms are not in the business of selling a 
“unified speech product,” the acts targeted by S.B. 7072 mirror the exercise of 
“editorial control and judgment” by a newspaper.  Like in a newspaper, “the 
decisions made as to limitations on the size and content” displayed on a social 
media website, and the platform’s “treatment of public issues and public 
officials—whether fair or unfair—constitute the exercise of editorial control and 
judgment.”  Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 258.  Simply put, as noted above, a newspaper’s 
choice of which op-eds, letters to the editor, or articles to include is akin to the acts 
targeted by S.B. 7072.  The fact that S.B. 7072 applies to a platform that facilitates 
public discourse among many other private speakers does not change the 
constitutional analysis.  See id. at 256 (“Governmental restraint on publishing need 
not fall into familiar or traditional patterns to be subject to constitutional 
limitations on governmental powers.”). 
Further, S.B. 7072 does more than restrict routine acts of editorial discretion 
relating to the prominence of a post on a news feed.  It explicitly seeks to curb 
what the legislation’s drafters have perceived as “bias” by “Big Tech.”  See, e.g., 
News Release, Governor Ron DeSantis Signs Bill to Stop the Censorship of 
Floridians by Big Tech, supra (“If Big Tech censors enforce rules inconsistently, 
to discriminate in favor of the dominant Silicon Valley ideology, they will now be 
held accountable.”).   
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 If taken to its logical extreme, the State’s “unified speech product” theory 
would categorically exempt entities that primarily facilitate third-party speech from 
all First Amendment protection.  “But a private speaker does not forfeit 
constitutional protection simply by combining multifarious voices, or by failing to 
edit their themes to isolate an exact message as the exclusive subject matter of the 
speech.”  Hurley, 515 U.S. at 569–70 (“[A] narrow, succinctly articulable message 
is not a condition of constitutional protection, which if confined to expressions 
conveying a ‘particularized message,’ would never reach the unquestionably 
shielded painting of Jackson Pollock, music of Arnold Schöenberg, or 
Jabberwocky verse of Lewis Carroll.”) (internal citation omitted).  Further, 
Defendants-Appellants offer no limiting principle to answer complex questions 
about, for instance, how this novel theory would apply to a hypothetical hybrid 
platform that produces its own news but also provides social networking 
functionality (like the early America Online).  See AOL’s ‘Walled Garden,’ Wall. 
St. J., Sept. 4, 2000.  Or, on the flip side, what would be the implications of the 
“unified speech product” concept for a traditional newspaper that permits readers 
to post comments online, as many do.  Under Defendants-Appellants’ theory, only 
speech that is created under the control of a speaker, selected for presentation in a 
specific way, and that conveys a consistent and discrete theme would be 
constitutionally protected from S.B. 7072’s hosting provisions under Tornillo, 
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leading to the perverse result that the government could regulate “bias” on a 
newspaper’s comments page, but not the newspaper. 
 The examples above serve to illustrate that not only does the “unified speech 
product” concept fail to capture the reality of social media platforms, it is 
incoherent, unworkable, and lacks any limiting principle to cabin its scope.  See 
United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 723 (2012) (stating that our First 
Amendment tradition stands against “governmental power [that] has no clear 
limiting principle.”).  The command of Tornillo is clear:  The government can have 
no role in dictating the editorial process. 
III. The news media landscape is constantly evolving and crediting the 
State’s “unified speech product” theory could lead to the direct 
censorship of “new media” platforms.   
 
 Today, people are much more likely to receive news through a digital 
platform than traditional print media—a trend that is accelerating.  While many 
Americans still get their news from news websites, social media sites are used by a 
majority of adults for at least some of their news consumption.  Elisa Schearer, 
More Than Eight-in-Ten Americans Get News from Digital Services, Pew Rsch. 
Ctr., Jan. 12, 2021, https://perma.cc/YPU9-77SK.  When accounting for 
generational differences, the pull toward social media is much greater, with young 
adults listing social media as their most frequent news source.  Id.; see also Jean 
M. Twenge et al., Trends in U.S. Adolescents’ Media Use, 1976–2016: The Rise of 
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Digital Media, the Decline of TV, and the (Near) Demise of Print, 8 Psychol. 
Popular Media Culture 329, 338 (2019) (finding that in 2016, while 82% of high 
school students used social media “almost every day,” 2% of high school students 
read the newspaper and only 16% read a book or magazine on a daily basis).  In 
short, for many people, and especially younger Americans, social media platforms 
are a primary source for learning about current events and participating in open 
dialogue about those events.   
 Moreover, although S.B. 7072 purports to be an effort to target only “Big 
Tech,” the evolution of online speech platforms is highly dynamic.  For instance, 
platforms like Substack, Medium, and Patreon have developed services that 
directly facilitate journalism by giving journalists the tools to effectively serve as 
their own publishers.  See Jacob Bogage, Reporters are Leaving Newsrooms for 
Newsletters, Their Own “Mini Media Empire,” Wash. Post, July 24, 2020 (noting 
a growing preference for direct engagement over curated newsfeeds); Nic 
Newman, The Resurgence and Importance of Email Newsletters, Reuters Institute 
Digital News Report (2020), https://perma.cc/DGL5-ZU2U (finding that email 
newsletters are gaining in popularity, particularly among news lovers).  Many of 
these platforms offer various backend services, such as editorial support, 
subscription management, web design, and even legal help.  See Legal Support for 
Substack Writers, Substack (July 15, 2020), https://perma.cc/86W6-46AC.  But 
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none of them would appear to qualify as “unified speech products” under 
Defendants-Appellants’ formulation.  In fact, Substack is focused so much on 
creator branding that Substack-hosted newsletters often have their own custom 
internet address, and a reader must look at the fine print on the newsletter to see the 
affiliation with Substack.  See, e.g., Popular Information, popular.info (last visited 
Nov. 10, 2021); Platformer, platformer.news (last visited Nov. 10, 2021).  
 While many of these platforms may not have the annual gross revenue or 
monthly participant numbers to qualify as a platform subject to regulation under 
S.B. 7072 today, the law, if allowed to take effect, would nonetheless have a 
significant, dire effect on this dynamism in new media.  First and foremost, it 
would establish a precedent that government officials may directly interfere with 
editorial choices by private speakers to enforce the state’s conception of “fairness” 
online, and that precedent would not be confined to platforms that meet the 
definition of a social media platform under S.B. 7072.  Rather, as noted above, the 
underlying logic behind Defendants-Appellants’ legal position is that entities that 
are primarily engaged in facilitating speech by other speakers to one another suffer 
no First Amendment harm at all under a scheme like S.B. 7072.  In other words, 
S.B. 7072 would open the door to direct content regulation—in service of policing 
“bias,” as perceived by the government—on the platforms that millions of 
Americans now use to get their news.  It is difficult to overstate the effect such a 
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precedent would have on the independence of public discourse from government 
control. 
 Second, the mere possibility that the government could expand these 
regulations to smaller platforms or other online services could chill public 
discourse, innovation in both social and traditional media online, and 
newsgathering and reporting.  Just as the existence of a “right-of-reply” law in the 
newspaper context could discourage news outlets from covering anything that 
would trigger such a right, platforms may also conclude “that the safe course is to 
avoid controversy.”  Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 257.  Further, that chill would likely fall 
most heavily on start-ups and smaller platforms, without the resources to navigate 
S.B. 7072’s “first-of-a-kind” bias-policing regime.  Powe, supra, at 273–74 
(discussing the substantial resources larger publishing entities have in relation to 
smaller entities).  Many will not enter the space at all, while others will host 
“safer” content, or avoid certain topics, to avoid drawing the government’s ire. 
 In short, the arguments proffered by the State for why S.B. 7072 does not 
offend the First Amendment would, if credited, have profound speech-suppressive 
effects far beyond just the platforms targeted by the law. 
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